Article: Supreme Court Holds That Nurse’s Competency To Provide Expert Opinion on Issue of Causation Should be Determined by Common Law Regarding Expert Qualifications and Applicable Statutes

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Supreme Court Holds That Nurse’s Competency To Provide Expert Opinion on Issue of Causation Should be Determined by Common Law Regarding Expert Qualifications and Applicable Statutes

As previously reported on obrlaw.com, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in a 2006 ruling, held that a nurse was qualified to offer expert testimony in Freed v. Geisinger Medical Ctr.

In June of 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider Freed and the question of whether a nurse may provide expert testimony on the issue of medical causation. 971 A.2d 1202 (Pa. 2009). Whereas the Superior Court in its opinion took great care to distinguish the facts of Freed from Flanagan v. Labe, 690 A.2d 183 (Pa. 1997), which held that nurses are prohibited from making medical diagnoses on the basis of the Professional Nursing Law, after consideration of the merits of stare decisis, the Supreme Court went right at Flanagan and overturned its prior ruling.

In a 3-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that whether a nurse is competent to provide expert opinion on the issue of causation should be determined based on the common law regarding expert qualifications and any applicable statutes, such as the MCARE Act. Primarily, the majority reasoned that there is no language in the Professional Nursing Law to suggest that the restrictions on nursing practice also apply to work done by nurses in the legal arena. Therefore, the Court concluded that Flanagan conflicted with the well established liberal standard regarding the qualification of expert witnesses. Freed was remanded for further proceedings concerning the qualifications of the nurse in question.

The Supreme Court’s June 2009 decision will not be its last word on Freed. Following the Supreme Court’s narrow decision which overruled Flanagan, the defense filed for reargument on the basis that the issue of the viability of Flanagan had not been before the Court as it had been waived by the plaintiff. At reargument held in December 2009, some members of the Court expressed skepticism at the notion that the Court could not reconsider one of its prior rulings sua sponte, noting also that the lower courts did not have the authority to overrule Flanagan; therefore, there was no reason for the plaintiff to advance this argument earlier. The Court also entertained new argument on whether Flanagan was rightly decided. A decision is expected next year.

 

 
 

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